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6.1  Introduction 
6.1.1  Overview of Reform Process 
Over the last twenty years, successive governments of Great Britain have 
embarked on a series of reforms of the pension’ program designed both to 
reduce the prospective costs of social security, and to permit more flexibil- 
ity and individual choice in secondary pension provision.’ Central to this 
Richard Disney is professor of labor economics at the University of  Nottingham and a re- 
search fellow of  the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS). Carl Emmerson is director of the pen- 
sions and public-spending research sector at IFS. Sarah Smith is a lecturer at the London 
School of  Economics and Political Science and a research associate at IFS. 
We are grateful to participants at the preconference, the editors, a referee, and Alissa Good- 
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I. There are some important differences in nomenclature between the United States and 
Europe. In Europe, the term “pension” tends to refer to all pensions, whether provided pub- 
licly (by the state) or privately. “Social security,” the term used for state-provided pensions in 
the United States, has a different connotation in Europe, generally referring to the whole so- 
cial insurance program. “Occupational pension scheme” is a specific term in Great Britain, 
referring to an employer-provided (group) pension plan. The basic state retirement pension 
in Great Britain, which pays (broadly) the same weekly amount to all pensioners, is often re- 
ferred to as a “flat rate” pension-although  in the United States, “flat rate” is sometimes used 
as a term for a proportional tax system. Finally, the word “scheme” does not have the same 
negative connotation as in U.S. parlance. We have broadly tried to adopt U.S. terminology in 
this paper. 
2.  The structure of the first tier of coverage (the basic state pension) was unchanged by these 
reforms, though its generosity was reduced. See Dilnot et al. (1994), Disney, Emmerson, and 
Tanner (1999), and Banks and Emmerson (2000). 
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strategy has been an evolution of the mechanism of “contracting-out,’’ in- 
troduced originally in 1978 as a means of integrating existing occupational 
pension  plans  into  the  new  State  Earnings-Related  Pension  Scheme 
(SERPS). In essence, contracting-out means that employers and employ- 
ees obtain part of their social security pension through a private pension 
fund instead of the state. In compensation for establishing a private ar- 
rangement, employers and employees pay a lower payroll tax rate (known 
as the National Insurance contribution). An important consequence arises 
because the social security program is purely pay-as-you-go (PAYG) fi- 
nanced, whereas most pension plans, at least in the private sector, are fully 
funded. Thus, greater contracting-out implies greater prefunding of pen- 
sion commitments. 
Under the 1978 arrangements, individuals could opt out of part of the 
social security pension, SERPS, only if they worked for an employer who 
provided  an approved defined benefit (DB) occupational pension plan. 
The approved employer’s plan guaranteed to pay the employee a pension 
approximately equal to what  they would  have received from the state, 
known as the Guaranteed Minimum Pension (GMP).’ In return, the em- 
ployer would pay a lower combined rate of employee and employer Na- 
tional Insurance contributions to the g~vernment.~ 
However, a major innovation in pension policy occurred in 1988, as  a re- 
sult of the 1986 Social Security Act. The government was worried by the 
projected cost of SERPS  once the baby boom generation began to retire in 
the first quarter of the twenty-first century (Hemming and Kay 1982; De- 
partment of Health and Social Security 1984), and sought to cut projected 
public pension expenditure. To  do this, it needed ways to encourage a 
greater number of individuals to contract out of SERPS. The government 
adopted a “stick-and-carrot’’ strategy to this problem. The “stick” was to 
reduce the generosity of SERPS considerably, so giving a greater incentive 
to opt out. But coverage by existing DB occupational pensions was stag- 
nating; therefore a “carrot” was needed. This took the form of giving indi- 
viduals and employers new incentives to contract out, by permitting defined 
contribution (DC)  pension plans also to opt out of SERPS, on what turned 
out be extremely favorable terms5  The government perhaps expected this 
extra “wave” of opting-out to occur through employer-based DC plans, 
3. There were, however, some important differences  for example, indexation postretire- 
ment of the GMP was in part subsidized by the government: see Dilnot et al. (1994) for fur- 
ther details. 
4. The difference between the “contracted-in” and “contracted-out” National Insurance 
rates is known as the “contracted-out  rebate.” Note that, in Britain, most income tax and Na- 
tional Insurance contributions, whether notionally levied on the employee or employer, are 
collected at source from the employer by the Inland Revenue. 
5. See discussion below, and National Audit Office (1991). Of course, employers offering 
DC plans could not guarantee a target benefit, so the employer was instead required to make 
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but in fact the dominant new form of arrangement became the individually 
purchased retirement saving account known as apersonalpension. 
Contracting-out works in a somewhat different manner in an individu- 
ally purchased personal pension.  Here the individual makes a contract 
with an approved private insurance company. The Department of Social 
Security (DSS) acts as the “clearinghouse,” so that the full National Insur- 
ance contribution is paid by the employer to the Inland Revenue, and the 
contracted-out rebate component is then transferred and paid directly by 
the DSS to the individual’s approved personal pension provider.’ 
Personal pensions were also encouraged by the fact that the 1988 legis- 
lation made membership of a pension plan, whether state provided or em- 
ployer provided, entirely a matter of choice. This meant that an individual 
had to have an approved contracted-out pension or belong to SERPS, but 
could not be forced by the employer to join the employer’s plan, if one was 
offered.8  Roughly 25 percent of the workforce (over 6 million employees) 
opted to purchase personal pensions over the period 1988-1 992, including 
some 1 million who opted to leave or not to join an existing employer’s 
pension plan. By  the middle of the 199Os, roughly three-quarters of the 
workforce had contracted out of SERPS into some form of private plan, 
whether DB or DC, or whether employer provided or individually pur- 
~hased.~ 
It should be noted, finally, that individuals are also free to switch in their 
working lives between different types of pension plans. Crucially, and un- 
like some other countries that have gone down this road, contracting-out 
of the social security program need not be permanent.’” Indeed, between 
6. Defined benefit plans are plans that guarantee a nominal benefit, typically related to a 
measure of salary. Defined contribution plans simply promise to pay an (unknown) annuity 
based on the accumulated fund of contributions plus investment returns. A reason for the 
popularity of personal pensions was that they were heavily advertised and sold. They offered 
greater flexibility and very generous tax reliefs, but a contributing factor arose because the 
government had just eliminated tax relief on life insurance. Many insurance companies there- 
fore switched their sales forces to the pension market, and this decision contributed a good 
deal to the subsequent controversy concerning the “mis-selling” of personal pensions. 
7. Thus the contracted-out rebate can be varied across individuals, which is not possible in 
a group scheme, where the same percentage rebate is paid for all scheme members. 
8. An individual could not contribute to a different company plan-say,  that of a previous 
employer. Benefits from such a plan would be “preserved” (deferred) and are revalued in line 
with price inflation. However, some pension plans, especially in the public sector, are sector 
specific rather than company specific. At the same time, an employer could not refuse to let 
an employee  join the company plan on the grounds of, say, being part-time, as this constituted 
a form of indirect discrimination (against women). For the same reason, differential vesting 
on grounds of gender is not permitted, and indeed, vesting periods in employer-provided 
plans are not a big issue in Britain, being very much shorter than in, say, the United States. 
9. Somewhat surprisingly, it is impossible to find any official data that provide the propor- 
tions of workers contracted-in or contracted-out to different types of pension plans, over 
time. 
10. For an analysis of opting-out arrangements in a number of countries, see Disney, Pala- 
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1988 and 1995, there were incentives for individuals who contracted out of 
SERPS to contract back in to the social security program at a later age 
(Disney and Whitehouse 1992b). 
These reforms, augmented by further substantial measures in 1995, are 
far from the end of the pension reform program in Great Britain. Indeed, 
in 1998 and 1999 the new Labour government proposed a number of further 
reforms, including yet another “route” for contracted-out private provi- 
sion (alongside occupational  and personal pensions) known  as “stake- 
holder pensions” (DSS 1998). These will basically be benchmarked per- 
sonal pensions, which all employers employing five or more people will 
be required  to make available to their employees at the workplace  (al- 
though they will not be directly provided by employers). The idea of this re- 
form is to provide a low-cost pension for those not covered by traditional 
employer plans, thereby reducing administrative charges relative to indi- 
vidual plans and making pension arrangements more transparent. While 
this is in some ways a positive step, given some of the difficulties with the 
other pension routes, there must be some concern as to whether further 
augmenting choice of individual pension arrangement assists in clarifying 
or simplifying Great Britain’s pension system. At the same time, over a 
long transition period, SERPS will be replaced by a more explicitly redis- 
tributive public pension benefit known as the State Second Pension (or, in 
some quarters, as S2P).” 
The main thrust of this paper, however, is not to go through the intrica- 
cies of Great Britain’s pension reform process in the  1980s and 1990s, 
which would require a whole volume. We do indeed sketch out Britain’s 
pension program in section 6.2,  mentioning some other important facets 
to the reform process, such as cutbacks in the flat basic state pension, and 
greater targeting on poor pensioners. The primary purpose, however, is to 
ask what impact these reforms might have on Britain’s economy.I2 The 
shifts to a greater share of private pension provision and to greater choice 
of pension provision reflect the central tenets of the Conservative adminis- 
trations of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. However, the Labour 
administration that came to power in 1997 showed no inclination to reverse 
this process of opting out of state provision, preferring instead further to 
focus public resources available on poorer pensioners by  increasing the 
generosity of the main means-tested benefit, through the Minimum In- 
come Guarantee. While 60 percent of pensioner income is currently pro- 
vided by the state, the current government has stated that it expects this to 
fall to 40 percent by the middle of this century (DSS 1998). 
1 1. For further discussion of all these issues, see Disney, Emmerson, and Tanner (1999). 
12. For some interesting details on the political process, see Lawson (1992) and Peacock 
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6.1.2  Pension Reform in Great Britain: The Issues and 
Summary of Our Main Findings 
This chapter therefore examines some of the implications of the se- 
quence of pension reforms for Britain’s economy. Given space constraints, 
we focus on impacts on the realeconomy, leaving aside developments in the 
financial economy, such as the consequences of greater private pension 
provision for the British capital market. In particular, we examine five as- 
pects of the economy where pension arrangements, and pension reform, 
might be expected to have some effects. These areas, with a summary of the 
main findings are as follows: 
The efect on macroeconomic performance through its impact on house- 
hold savings rates. Contributions to occupational pension funds have 
significantly  contributed  to  household  saving  for  many  years  in 
Britain. The introduction of personal pensions in 1988  had both a pos- 
itive substitution effect, increasing household saving rates, and a pos- 
itive effect on wealth that will have reduced household saving rates. 
Our tentative conclusion is that personal pensions contributed a neg- 
ligible net amount to household saving at the end of the 1980s, despite 
massive take-up. But a decade later, due to the fact that contributions 
direct from individuals and their employers had become more impor- 
tant than those from the DSS-paid, contracted-out rebate, personal 
pensions are likely to have contributed more substantially to house- 
hold saving. 
The efSect on publicjinances, and especially the government’s intertem- 
poralbudget constraint. Permitting individuals to opt out of part of the 
state pension program has both intertemporal effects (current versus 
future tax rates) and intragenerational effects (the relative tax rates 
paid  by  opted-out [contracted-out] and contracted-in individuals). 
These effects arise from the PAYG nature of the financing of the state 
pension program. Our conclusion is that the contracting-out arrange- 
ments have raised payroll tax rates by around 2 1/2 to 3 percentage 
points, relative to the status quo. It will reduce payroll tax rates by 
somewhat less as opted-out pensioners  retire later in this century. 
Note that it is inherent in rational voluntary switching that the gov- 
ernment never recoups fully its initial payroll tax reductions designed 
to encourage opting out. 
The impact on the distribution ojincomes. Ideally, we need a lifetime 
perspective to trace the impact of greater contracting-out on lifetime 
incomes. In static comparisons, for example of pensioner inequality, 
we might expect greater contracting-out to lead to greater inequality 
for two reasons. First, private pension incomes may be more volatile. 238  Richard Disney, Carl Emmerson, and Sarah Smith 
Second, in the 1980s and 1990s, average private pensions grew much 
faster  than  the  contracting-out  arrangements  had  assumed. This 
made them worth more than state pensions, and better-off earners 
tend to contract out. The future impact of personal pensions on in- 
come inequality will depend not just on future investment returns but 
also on the retirement behavior of optants. 
EfSects on labor supply (and especially retirement behavior). Different 
types of pension plans have different effects on retirement behavior. 
There has been a trend to earlier retirement, especially among men, in 
Great Britain in the 1980s and 1990s.  This has been encouraged by the 
use of existing occupational pension plans and by the relative gener- 
osity of the public disability system-since  somewhat reduced (Blun- 
dell and Johnson 1999; Disney 1999). The majority of optants to per- 
sonal pensions are somewhat younger than the average workforce and 
the effect on retirement behavior cannot yet be seen. It is clear that DB 
plans will discourage early retirement relative to DC  plans, due to the 
fact that the former are back-loaded while the latter are front-loaded 
(Blundell, Meghir, and Smith 2001). However, contracting out of state 
pensions into a personal pension has both a wealth effect and a sub- 
stitution effect that work in opposite directions for the labor supply of 
older workers. The net impact on labor supply could go either way. 
EfSects on the general operation qf  the labor market-in  particular, how 
pension reforms might have uflectedlabor marketflexibility. Here we fo- 
cus on job mobility and take-up of personal pensions, the hypothesis 
being that individualized personal pensions encourage more mobility, 
or at least, are taken up by more mobile workers. Given the inherent 
simultaneity of this issue, it is hard to identify causation. Nevertheless, 
the introduction of personal pensions offers an unusual “natural ex- 
periment,” arising from the ability of individuals to choose a personal 
pension in preference to a company pension plan, if offered. We show 
that individuals that chose to opt out of a company pension plan did 
indeed exhibit significantly higher subsequent job mobility. In prin- 
ciple, further analysis of this experiment will offer a more precise test 
than the existing (largely inconclusive)  literature on pension plan 
tenure and job mobility. 
6.2  Overview of Reforms in Great Britain 
6.2.1  Broad Framework of Britain’s Pension Provision 
This section briefly outlines Britain’s current pension system, and the re- 
forms made over the last twenty years. A more detailed description can be 
found in, among others, Budd and Campbell (1998); Dilnot et al. (1994); Pension Reform and Economic Performance  239 
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Fig. 6.1 
Source: Disney, Emmerson, and Tanner (1999). 
Schema of Great Britain’s pension scheme, 2001 
Banks and Emmerson (2000), and Emmerson and Johnson (2002). Figure 
6.1 provides a diagrammatic representation of the current pension system. 
Britain’s pension system is split into three tiers. The first is provided by 
the state, and consists of the basic state pension and a significant means- 
tested (noncontributory) benefits sector. The basic state pension is a flat 
contributory benefit that is financed on a PAYG basis. The basic state pen- 
sion in 2001-2002 was worth E72.50 a week for a single pensioner,13  which 
is about 15 percent of average male earnings. This is down from around 20 
percent of average earnings in the early 1980s,  which is as a result of the ba- 
sic state pension’s having been increased broadly in line with price inflation 
since 198  1 while average earnings have grown in real terms. 
Those on low incomes are eligible for the Minimum Income Guarantee 
(MIG), which in 2001-2002  was worth 692.15 a week for a single pen- 
sioner, nearly &20  more than the basic state pension (Her Majesty’s Trea- 
sury 2000~).  In addition, pensioners on low incomes may be eligible for 
housing benefit and council tax benefit, which are means-tested benefits 
designed to provide assistance toward housing costs and local taxes, re- 
spectively. In 1998-1999 some 21 percent of pensioner couples and 47 per- 
cent of  single pensioners were in receipt of means-tested benefits (DSS 
2000~).  Government policy is, in the medium term at least, to continue in- 
creasing the basic state pension in line with prices while increasing the 
MIG in line with average earnings. Since the MIG is withdrawn at a rate of 
13. The rate for couples was L115.90 (Her Majesty’s Treasury 2000b). 240  Richard Disney, Carl Emmerson, and Sarah Smith 
100 percent, those with small amounts of income are left no better off than 
those with small amounts of income from savings. In response, the govern- 
ment has proposed the introduction of a new “pension credit” from Octo- 
ber 2003, which will also be targeted at those with relatively low incomes.I4 
The social security system is financed on a PAYG  basis. There is no 
equivalent of the U.S. Social Security Trust Fund, although the National 
Insurance fund has accrued surpluses over recent years (House of Com- 
mons 2000). There are no plans to prefund  social security, other than 
through the indirect route of contracting out. Formally, the basic state pen- 
sion and SERPS are financed from an earmarked payroll tax, the National 
Insurance contribution, notionally levied on employees up to an earnings 
ceiling and on employers with no earnings ceiling. Income-tested benefits 
are funded out of general taxation. 
As described in the introduction, the second tier of mandatory pension 
provision is split between both state provision, in the form of the SERPS, 
and private pension provision, in the form of occupational pensions and 
personal pensions. The original SERPS scheme was introduced in 1978. 
This paid an individual one-quarter of his or her earnings between a lower 
and an upper limit from the best twenty years of the individual’s lifetime. 
Earnings were to be uprated to  pension age by growth in average earnings, 
with payments in retirement then being indexed to prices. The Social Se- 
curity Act of 1986 reduced the generosity of SERPS by lowering the pay- 
ments to 20 percent of an individual’s average earnings, with the average 
now to be calculated over the individual’s entire lifetime, rather than his or 
her best twenty years.I5 
Individuals were able to contract out of SERPS into an employer’s oc- 
cupational pension plan as long as it guaranteed a retirement income at 
least as high as SERPS-hence  these plans had to operate on a DB basis. 
In return for opting out, both they and their employers paid a lower rate of 
National Insurance contribution. The 1986 Social Security Act took the 
principle of opting-out further by allowing individuals to choose to con- 
tract out of SERPS into a DC pension. In return for opting out of SERPS 
in this way the government paid part of an individual’s National Insurance 
contribution into his or her pension fund. Since this payment was relatively 
generous, this led to an enormous growth in personal pension take-up. 
More controversially the 1986 Social Security Act also allowed individuals 
the right to opt out of an occupational pension plan and into a personal 
pension. This underlay the “mis-selling” scandal of the late 1980s-early 
14. For more information, see DSS (2000b) and Clark (2001,2002). 
15. For more details see, for cxample, Emmerson and Johnson (2002). The original SERPS 
scheme could also be inherited in full by a surviving spouse. The 1986 Social Security Act re- 
duced this to 50 percent for those widowed after April 2000. However, this change is now be- 
ing phased-in over a longer period as a result of government documentation failing to inform 
individuals of this change. See National Audit Office (2000) for more details. Pension Reform and Economic Performance  241 
1990s. This involved cases of people who were badly advised to take out 
personal pensions when they would have been better off  staying in-or 
joining-their  employers’ occupational pension plans. A large number of 
people were affected. By August 1999, some 400,000 people had been of- 
fered more than E2.6 billion compensation for having been mis-sold a per- 
sonal pension.16 
Further reform is also underway. SERPS  is set to be replaced by the State 
Second Pension-which  will be a flat rate-top up to the basic state pension 
and hence more redistributive toward lower earners.” In addition, the gov- 
ernment is introducing a “stakeholder pension,” which is essentially a per- 
sonal pension with a heavily regulated charging structure, including an 
overall cap on charges. Every employer will have to designate a pension 
provider (such as an insurance company) to the employees and allow indi- 
viduals to make contributions direct from their wages. Employers will not, 
however, have to make any contribution on their employees’ behalf.I8 
Finally, there is a third tier of voluntary private retirement saving, This 
can involve making additional voluntary contributions (AVCs) into occu- 
pational pension plans, or additional saving through personal pensions or 
in close substitutes among other financial assets (see Emmerson and Tan- 
ner 2000). 
6.2.2  Demographic Trends and Projections of Pension Costs 
As  in most developed countries, the ratio of those over pension age to 
those in work is set to rise in Great Britain over the next thirty years. How- 
ever, aging of the population is set to be less severe than in many Organi- 
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries 
(Bos et al. 1994). Moreover, due to the reforms made to Britain’s pension 
system over the last twenty years, the cost of the current system is not pro- 
jected to require higher rates of National Insurance, as shown in table 6.1. 
This is a result of reforms such as the change to price indexation of the ba- 
sic state pension in 1981, the substantial reduction in SERPS generosity in 
the Social Security acts of 1986 and 1995, and the increase in the state pen- 
sion age for women aged sixty to sixty-five, which is being phased in by 
2020. The reforms to SERPS reduce expenditure on SERPS  in 2030-203 1 
to around just 30 percent of the level implied by the original scheme (Banks 
and Emmerson 2000). While the replacement of SERPS with the State Sec- 
16. See Financial Services Authority (2000) for more details. 
17. Under current policies, while the State Second Pension will be a flat-rate pension, the 
rebates paid to those opting out of this scheme will remain related to earnings. This will pro- 
vide greater incentives for lower earners to stay in, or return to, the state scheme and for 
middle and higher earners to opt out of the state scheme. In future the rebate structure could 
be changed to mitigate these effects. 
18. For a more detailed description of the government’s proposed pension reforms see, for 
example, Disney, Emmerson, and Tanner (1999), Emmerson and Tanner (1999), and Agulnik 
et al. (1999). 242  Richard Disney, Carl Emmerson, and Sarah Smith 
Table 6.1  Long-Term Projections for the National Insurance Fund (July 1999) 
2000-01  2010-11  2020-21  2030-31  2050-51 




State expenditures (&billions, 
1999--2000  prices) 
Basic state pension 
SERPS 
Total expenditure” 
Total expenditure as a share of 
Joint employee and employer 
GDP  per pensioner spending 
GDP  (0%) 
contribution ratesb 














































Source: Government Actuary’s Department (1999). These costings do not include the government an- 
nouncement that the basic state pension was set to rise by more than inflation in April 2001 and April 
2002. These increases do  not stop  National Insurance contribution rates’ being able to fall in future. 
Notes: See text for explanation of abbreviations. 
dIncludes  incapacity benefit, jobseeker’s allowance, and some other (more minor) benefits and expenses. 
bContribution  rates exclude the 1.95 percent currently payable to the National Health Service, and are 
based on the rate structure introduced in the Social Security Act 1998. 
ond Pension will lead to an increase in state expenditure, the required Na- 
tional Insurance contribution rate is still projected to fall by 2030. 
6.2.3  The “Pension Burden”: Comparison with Other Countries 
The reforms to Britain’s pension system have ensured that future liabili- 
ties will, at the very least, not require substantial rises in tax rates. This is 
in contrast with many other developed countries, as shown in table 6.2. 
Great Britain is the only country in which state pension expenditures are 
forecast to fall. The table also shows that only the United States, of the 
countries considered, spends a smaller percentage of national income on 
public pension benefits. 
While these reforms have led Britain’s pension system to sustainability in 
terms of costs it remains to be seen whether it is politically sustainable, with 
the proportion of national income given in public pensions to each pen- 
sioner falling to 75 percent of the current level by 2030 and 56 percent by 
2050. It should also be remembered that these costings do not include the 
cost of means-tested benefits to pensioners, which in 1998-1999 was some 
1  .O percent of gross domestic product (GDP; Banks and Emmerson 2000). 
The government’s long-term aim to increase the MIG in line with average 
earnings, and the introduction of the pension credit in October 2003, will Pension Reform and Economic Performance  243 









2000  2010 
5.0  5.3 
9.8  9.7 
11.5  11.8 
12.6  13.2 
7.5  9.6 
4.8  5.2 
4.5  5.2 
4.2  4.5 
Net Liability, 
2020  2030  2040  2050  1995-2050” 
6.9  9.0  9.1  8.7 
11.6  13.5  14.3  14.4 
12.3  16.5  18.4  17.5 
15.3  20.3  21.4  20.3 
12.4  13.4  14.9  16.5 
6.7  8.3  9.4  9.8 
5.1  5.5  4.0  4.1 









~~  ~ 
Sources; Roseveare et al. (1996); Chand and Jaeger (1996) for net pension liabilities. 
aThe  sum of projected future deficits, each expressed as percentage of projected future GDP. 
add to these future liabilities. Also, previous demographic forecasts have 
tended to underestimate improvements in longevity and hence underesti- 
mate pension liabilities (Disney 2000). 
6.2.4  Economics of the Choice of Private Pension Provider 
The decision to opt out of the social security program involves assessing 
the present value of the alternatives (Disney, Palacios, and Whitehouse 
1999).  For an individual offered the chance ofjoining an occupational pen- 
sion plan, the decision will depend on the likely time path of salary and ex- 
pected job tenure. For an individual choosing between a personal pension 
and some form of DB plan-whether  publicly or employer provided-age 
and expected returns are key determinants. Simply put, contributions put 
into a DC plan such as a personal pension earlier in the working life com- 
pound over a longer period, while the fund will cumulate over both nega- 
tive and positive investment shocks the longer the period to retirement. 
Moreover, predicted returns to the social security program for later co- 
horts are expected to decline significantly (Disney and Whitehouse 1993b). 
In contrast, in any DB plan where there are penalties to early leaving and 
where pension benefits are in some way related to length of tenure and to 
final salary, later contributions “earn” a greater prospective pension (for il- 
lustrations, see Bodie, Marcus, and Merton 1988; and, in the British con- 
text, Disney and Whitehouse 1996). Consequently, we  should expect op- 
tants for personal pensions to be relatively young, in contrast to, say, the 
age structure of purchasers of individual retirement accounts in the United 
States, where there is no similar choice-based structure of second-tier pen- 
sion provision. 
This finding is confirmed in figure 6.2: the median age of personal pen- 
sion optants is the early thirties. This is important if we  are to understand 





g  20  - 
2  a 
10 
0 d 
18 to 24 
Fig. 6.2  Personal 1 
25 to 34 
nsion coverage, by age, gem 
El Women (full-time) 
Women (part-time) 
0  Men (full-time) 
n 
45 to 54  55 and over 
r, and employment status, 1998 
Source; Office for National Statistics (2000). 
Notes; Employees in Great Britain aged 18 and over, excluding those in youth training and 
employment training. Part-time male employees not shown due to small sample sizes. 
and where they might not (e.g., on observed retirement behavior). Of course 
it is hard for people to make this type of  forward-looking calculus, and 
Britain’s program is overly complex. Nevertheless, the evidence on the age 
distribution of optants and on the association of pension choice with sub- 
sequent job tenure described in section 6.6 do suggest that people make 
some effort to understand the consequences of the pension choices that 
they make.I9 
Private pension coverage also varies by earnings. Those in more highly 
paid jobs are more likely to be members of an occupational pension plan. 
As shown in figure 6.3, coverage of personal pensions is distributed more 
widely across the earnings distribution. Only among those not in paid em- 
ployment and those in the lowest 10 percent of the earnings distribution 
does personal pension coverage fall below 20 percent.2” 
19. We reiterate that it is important to differentiate between people choosing to buy a per- 
sonal pension instead of joining SERPS, where most evidence (such as Disney and White- 
house 1992b) suggest that optants made the “right” choice given expected returns and tax in- 
centives in the early 1990s, and those choosing to opt out of a company plan to buy a personal 
pension, where there was some evidence of overenthusiastic  “mis-selling” for which some op- 
tants subsequently received compensation. 
20. Before April 2001, people with no earnings could not contribute to a personal pension 
since contributions were earnings related. The fact that personal pension coverage among 
non-earners  is nonzero reflects the fact that the question on personal pensions asks about the 
previous twelve months. From April 2001 the annual contribution limit is a flat f3,600 per 
year or an earnings-related amount, whichever is greater (subject to a cap on pensionable 
earnings). This means that non-earners will be able to contribute to a personal (or stake- 
holder) pension for the first time. There is also no age limit, so some babies will find them- 
selves with a pension taken out on their behalf. Pension Reform and Economic Performance  245 
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6.3  Pension Reform and Macroeconomic  Performance 
6.3.1  Impact on Saving of the Demographic Transition 
and Pension Reform 
At the macroeconomic level, the simplest view of contracting-out sees it 
as shifting pension provision from a tax-financed basis to one in which 
pensions are increasingly funded through private saving. With greater in- 
ducements to contract out, as were put in place in the late 1980s, measured 
personal saving rates should therefore rise simply because of the way that 
national accounts data treat individual saving relative to payroll tax con- 
tributions. Leaving aside accounting conventions, however, it is still gener- 
ally accepted in the literature that the national saving rate and capital stock 
will be higher in an economy where pension provision is funded rather than 
tax financed, although the rate of return on capital will be lower.2'  Whether, 
21. This is in general the case so long as Ricardian equivalence does not hold-that  is, in- 
dividuals do not adjust their saving behavior fully to offset changes in future tax liabilities, 
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in turn, an economy with a funded pension program grows faster depends 
on the exact  growth mechanism  postulated-in  the basic Swan-Solow 
model, for example, the long-run growth rate is independent of the saving 
rate, whereas in many endogenous growth “stories,” the growth rate de- 
pends positively on the saving rate. 
This speculation on the likely behavior of household saving rates should 
also take account of the demographic transition. The future British econ- 
omy will be one with a lower support ratio of those of working age to pen- 
sioners (see section 6.2.2)-indeed,  this was one motivation for the shift to 
funded provision. What is the effect on saving of this declining support ra- 
tio? On the one hand, if individuals live longer with a constant retirement 
age and a continued replenishment of the labor force (as seems to be the 
British scenario), a simple life-cycle hypothesis (LCH) model would sug- 
gest that the average saving rate should be higher (Modigliani 1986). On 
the other hand, if the size of the workforce is actually declining, capital re- 
quirements are less and the saving rate need no longer be so high to main- 
tain the workforce’s capital stock (Cutler et al. 1990). Hence we also need 
to take account of the fact that the baby boom generation is currently 
middle-aged, and, in a standard LCH model of saving, are strong net savers. 
As they retire, however, they should become net dissavers, even if the way 
that saving rates are measured often conceals this fact (Miles 1999). On 
balance, therefore, this combination of demographic trends and pension 
reform  suggests  that the  underlying  saving  rate  in  Britain’s economy 
should be increasing. 
Figure 6.4 charts the annual average household saving rate against net 
accumulation in private pension plans over the period 1970-1996.22  This 
latter series, which is the diference between inflows of accumulated contri- 
butions and investment returns, and outflows of pension lump sums and 
disbursements of annuities, is much more stable than the household saving 
rate, which exhibits some countercyclical volatility. Since aggregate house- 
hold saving rates are net flows, typically calculated as residuals, it is hard 
exactly to measure the contribution of pension contributions in total sav- 
ing. Disney (1997) suggests that of around 565 billion net saving in non- 
fixed assets in Great Britain in 1996, roughly &21  billion was through em- 
ployer-provided pension plans and E3.7 billion through personal pensions. 
There is no obvious trend in retirement saving despite the introduction 
of new retirement saving instruments, notably personal pensions. But as 
can be seen from the cited statistics, saving in personal pensions is still rel- 
atively low.  An important related  issue, however, is  how much  saving 
22. As a result of Great Britain’s introducing the European System of Accounts 1995, the 
methodology for calculating the saving rate has changed and it is no longer possible to get a 
consistent series for saving in private pensions. Between 1996 and 2000 the saving rate fell 
sharply. For more details see Disney, Emmerson, and Wakefield (2001). Pension Reform and Economic Performance  247 
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Fig. 6.4  Saving rate and rate of saving in funded pensions, 1970 to 1996 
Source; Office for National Statistics (1998). 
Note: Uses figures calculated before the introduction of the 1995 European System of Ac- 
counts. 
through personal pensions is net new saving, rather than just saving that 
would have been held in other forms. To examine this, we have to consider 
some further extensions of our model. Implicit in our stylized discussion is 
a LCH model of a representative individual, with identical rates of return 
between all forms of pension “saving,” no precautionary saving, and no 
differences in the risk attached to contributions to the social security pro- 
gram and to private pension plans. The pension reform process in Britain 
does not warrant such assumptions, and some further analysis is required. 
Differential Rates of Return 
When considering whether the introduction of personal pensions would 
be expected to have led to an increase in saving it is important to consider 
both wealth and substitution effects arising from the policy change. A ba- 
sic issue is whether “saving” in the form of contributions to a private pen- 
sion plan rather than through the social security system has a zero impact 
on private-sector wealth, when discounted at the risk-adjusted rate of re- 
turn (Engen and Gale 1997). The answer depends on the implicit internal 
rate of return on social security contributions relative to the return on sav- 
ing in a private pension plan. It also depends on the return on savings in 
new pension instruments (such as personal pensions) relative to the return 
on similar financial assets (if any) that were previously available. If the dis- 248  Richard Disney, Carl Emmerson, and Sarah Smith 
counted return on net social security wealth is negative (as has clearly been 
the case in Britain),23  then permitting individuals to “invest” part of their 
National Insurance contribution in a contracted-out scheme generates a 
positive retirement  wealth effect. This might induce an increase in con- 
sumption and therefore a reduction in other personal saving. On the other 
hand, to the extent that personal pensions, for example, are “new” assets- 
for example, if they are able to offer higher returns (at least, in their tax- 
relieved treatment)-the  reforms may have created new saving and as well 
as diverting saving. 
There are two types of contributions to personal pensions. First, there 
are payments of contracted-out rebates (CORs) via the DSS. Assuming 
these would otherwise have been contributed to the social security pro- 
gram (SERPS) and earned low returns, these transfers induce a positive 
lifetime wealth effect that should increase consumption and reduce other 
saving. On the other hand, payments of discretionary contributions into 
plans, on top of CORs, should represent some new net saving, depending 
on how substitutable personal pensions are with existing financial assets 
that are not retirement-saving vehicles.24 
Figure 6.5 charts both payments of contracted-out rebates by DSS into 
personal pension accounts and discretionary contributions by employees 
and by employers on their behalf over the period 1988-1989 to 1998-1999. 
Note the reversal of the relative magnitude of these inflows over the period, 
largely arising from effective cutbacks in the value of CORs in the 1993 and 
1995 Social Security acts.25  Given the wealth and substitution effects, one 
might reasonably conclude that there was little or no net saving through 
personal pensions at the start of the period but a more significant amount 
by the late 1990~~~ 
23. Disney and Whitehouse (1993a,b) found negative returns on social security contribu- 
tions for men born after 1955 even before the cutbacks in provision in the 1990s. 
24. Pinning down the magnitude of this substitution effect has proved difficult in the U.S. 
literaturc; for contrasting views see the Journal of Economic Perspectives (1 996). 
25. The 1993 legislation reduced the generous rebates given to people aged under thirty to 
opt into a personal pension. The 1995  legislation as  a logical extension, implemented in 1997, 
related the size of the contracted-out rebate to age-see  Disney and Whitehouse (1992a). 
There are falls in thc aggregate contributions of CORs to personal pensions after both 1993- 
1994 and 1997-1998  in figure 6.5. 
26. Disney, Emmcrson, and Wakefield (2001) use the following benchmarks. Suppose the 
marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is 0.07, and 70 percent of payment of CORs 
into personal pensions is treated as “new” pension wealth by households. Then other saving 
will be reduced by 4.9 percent of contracted-out rebates paid into personal pensions-this  is 
a pure wealth effect. The net saving effect is Ihe total amount paid in discretionary contribu- 
tions into personal pensions, less the “offset” impact on other saving and the tax subsidy. As- 
sume this offset coefficient rose from 0.3 to 0.4 over the period as closer substitutes became 
available, and that the tax relief on discretionary contributions averaged 0.23. These figures 
are comparable with averages from other studies of saving effects, as discussed in that paper. 
Then simple arithmetic suggests that personal pensions contributed less than an additional 
f0.5 billion to household saving in 1988-1989 but close to f2  billion in 1998-1999. The  latter 
is around 0.2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Pension Reform and Economic Performance  249 
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Contributions to personal pensions, by type of contribution 
Pension Reform, Income Distribution, and Saving 
Section 6.4 focuses on the distributional impact of the pension reforms. 
Nevertheless, some preliminary remarks are useful in the context of sav- 
ing. First, social security provision is likely to be more redistributive than 
private provision. This factor is likely to be enhanced where contracting- 
out is voluntary, which permits richer households to opt out of redistribu- 
tion. The fact that the majority of the workforce have contracted out of 
SERPS limits the potential for redistribution  in both political and eco- 
nomic terms. 
At  first  sight,  redistribution  from  high-  to low-income households 
should reduce aggregate saving when saving is disproportionately carried 
out by richer  household^.^' But, as Gale (1 998) points out, the ultimate out- 
come may be reduced if low- and high-income households have differing 
substitution  elasticities between  social security,  private  pensions,  and 
other assets. High-income households may alter their saving patterns (e.g., 
by changing their asset portfolios) to offset the redistributive impact of so- 
cial security; while, if low-income households do not save at all, the degree 
of redistribution has little impact on those households’ behavior. 
In addition, the redistribution  inherent in pension programs is more 
complex than simply from “rich” to “poor” people. In the first place, we 
27. For empirical evidence for Britain, see Banks and Tanner (1999). 250  Richard Disney, Carl Emmerson, and Sarah Smith 
have to look at lifetime incomes, and take differential longevity into ac- 
count. Second, there are also issues to do with gender, such as how spouses 
are treated (Disney and Johnson 2001, Introduction). In fact, the British 
social security pension system, prereform, was not particularly redistribu- 
tive in  terms of lifetime  incomes  across the male  income distribution 
(Creedy, Disney, and Whitehouse 1993).  The main beneficiaries of redistri- 
bution were women, who reached state pension age earlier (sixty rather than 
sixty-five), lived longer, and disproportionately benefited from spouses’ 
benefits. So how reform affects household saving rates is unclear a priori, 
depending on, for example, whether couples take account of each other’s 
survival probabilities (or any other joint aspects, for that matter) in their 
individual saving decisions. 
Risks Attached to Alternative Pensions 
A standard argument is that DB plans involve risk sharing, whether be- 
tween generations and individuals (in a public program), or between em- 
ployers and employees (in occupational pension plans). If individual em- 
ployees are risk averse, then contracting out into a DC  account (such as a 
personal pension) changes the risk environment facing individuals (Bohn 
1997) and should affect the amount of precautionary saving. Of course, 
social security is not devoid of risk (political risk)-for  example, the sub- 
stantial reductions in the generosity of state pensions in Great Britain that 
have occurred over the last twenty years. It is also true that occupational 
pension  plans have  not always been  divorced  from individual  risk  in 
Britain, as the Maxwell scandal indicated.2x  Nevertheless, this issue is an 
important one in a mandatory transition strategy, particularly where indi- 
viduals perceive the change as implying a change in the risk environment. 
However, the voluntary nature of contracting-out in Britain presumably 
permits those with different risk-return trade-offs to choose alternative 
strategies. The issue, therefore, is one of whether people fully understand 
the risks involved in alternative pension choices in Britain (Banks and Em- 
merson 2000). But, whether they understand them or not, this risk issue 
should not affect the saving rate a good deal.29 
28. There is no equivalent of the pension fund guarantee that exists in the United States to 
provide some insurance across plans. Instead, occupational pension funds are required to sat- 
isfy certain investment  requirements that are monitored by  the plan  trustees. It is these 
arrangements that broke down in the Maxwell case when auditors discovered that the pen- 
sion funds of the Robert Maxwell Group had been lent, with no collateral, to private compa- 
nies within the group, leaving no funds available to satisfy the pension liabilities. For a lucid 
description of this event, and the aftermath, see Blake (1995). The 1995 legislation has tight- 
ened up the supervisory mechanisms. Bear in mind also that the component of the pension 
benefit that is supposed to substitute for the state benefit, SERPS, was guaranteed. 
29. In other words, if individuals choose personal pensions because they are less risk averse, 
they should not engage in (greater) precautionary saving. If they do not perceive the polen- 
tial change in the risk environment, it should not aflect their other saving either. Pension Reform and Economic Performance  251 
6.3.2  The Public Finances and the “Transition Burden” 
Our analysis of saving behavior examines the implications of the shift 
from tax-financed social security to funded provision. But this transition 
comes at a price-a  price that has been a pertinent consideration for the 
British economy in the past two decades, and for the foreseeable future. A 
consequence of a transition toward a larger funded component of the pen- 
sion program is a higher current average payroll tax rate than would oth- 
erwise be the case. Current social security liabilities have to be financed 
from a smaller tax base, given that contracting-out reduces tax receipts 
from National Insurance contributions. 
Table 6.3 provides some official evidence on the impact of contracting- 
out on the average payroll tax burden. It shows that National Insurance 
contribution rates are some 2 1/2 to 3 percentage points higher than they 
would otherwise be as a result of contracting out, with around 1 percent- 
age point arising from the introduction of personal pensions alone. Note 
from figure 6.5 that this percentage attributable to personal pensions was 
even higher in the late 198Os, at a time when the government was attempt- 
ing to reduce “headline” direct tax rates. 
Moreover, in two further respects, this understates the impact of private 
pension saving on underlying tax rates. First, private pension plans are tax 
relieved, relative to other saving instruments in other respects, but most 
notably in that they permit members to take a quarter of the accrued fund 
in a DC plan, or 1 1/2 times final salary in a DB plan, as a tax-free lump 
sum. Emmerson and Johnson (2002) estimate that, on an expenditure tax 
basis, this is equivalent to around &2  billion in lost revenue, in 1998-1999 
prices. Second, employer contributions to pension plans are exempt from 
National Insurance contributions. Therefore, as policy induced greater 
Table 6.3  Cost to National Insurance Fund of Contracting-Out Arrangements, 
1999-2000 
cost 
Type of Contribution  &Billions  Yo  GDP 
Occupational schemes deducted from NICs received  6.0  0.7 
DC occupational schemes paid direct to scheme  0.1  0.0 
Personal pensions paid direct to insurer 
Total 
Increase in NIC rate implied by CORs 
If employer rate increased 
If employee rate increased 
2.7  0.3 
8.8  1.0 
2%  percentage points 
3 percentage points 
Sources: Her Majesty’s Treasury (2000a,d). 
Nares: A larger increase in the employee rate is required to raise the f8.8 billion, since it is 
levied on a smaller range of earnings. See text for explanation of abbreviations. 252  Richard Disney, Carl Emmerson, and Sarah Smith 
contracting out, it also raised payroll tax rates at the time that employers 
and individuals chose to contract out. 
Of course, the rationale for prefunding is that future tax rates will be 
lower because accrued social security pension rights are reduced. But note 
that, in a voluntary system of contracting out, so long as  private agents are 
rational, a government can never expect to fully recoup the tax “cost” aris- 
ing in the first instance, because only individuals who expect to gain from 
the switch should do so and this switching will be at the expense of expected 
government revenues in the long run. In practical terms, this implies that, 
in setting the CORs, the government has had to make assumptions con- 
cerning prospective future rates of return on funded contributions such as 
to ensure that the private funder can pay a benefit at least as high as the so- 
cial security benefit forgone. If the rebate is too high, some opting agents 
will be compensated excessively (this is the source of the retirement wealth 
effect described previously). Set the rebate too low, and no agent will con- 
tract out. There is plenty of evidence that the government has systemati- 
cally erred on the side of generosity in order to maximize contracting 
However, the current higher payroll tax rate is offset, and the future cost 
reduction enhanced, insofar as social security liabilities have been reduced 
over time by measures such as the decision to  link pensions in payment to 
the growth of  prices rather than the higher of prices or earnings growth, 
since 1981. With sustained real earnings growth over much of the period 
since 198  1, this has reduced the value of the basic flat pension from 198  1 to 
the present time. On current trends, the basic pension is expected to be 
worth less than 7 percent of earnings in 2050.?’ 
The burden of the transition to greater funding of pensions in Britain is 
therefore shared across generations and within generations. Current pen- 
sioners bear the cost in part because state pension benefits have been cut. 
While current workers who remain contracted-in may well expect lower 
state pensions in retirement, they still bear it in part because the National 
Insurance contribution  rate  is higher  than it would  otherwise be,  and 
contracted-out workers in occupational pension plans because they are 
generally making direct contributions to their own pension on top of their 
residual National Insurance  contribution^.^^ The only group for which in- 
cidence is unclear in principal are rebate-only optants for personal pen- 
sions-that  is,  individuals who  make no contributions  other  than the 
contracted-out rebate to their personal pensions, Clearly their current bur- 
30. See Disney and Whitehouse (1992a,b, 1993a) for details. 
31. This became a political “hot potato” for the Labour government in 1999-2000, ironi- 
cally as a result of the success of its anti-inflation strategy. After an increase in the basic state 
pension of only 75  pence per week was announced in 1999, pressure from a number of groups 
induced an announcement of increases in 2000 well above the rate of inflation. 
32. Some public-sector occupational schemes have not levied employee contributions to 
cover prospective  liabilities, but  there is  a trend  toward more transparent contribution 
arrangements in such schemes (Cabinet Office 2000). Pension Reform and Economic Performance  253 
den within the program is zero, and whether they ultimately “pay” for the 
transition depends on whether their final pensions are higher or lower than 
they would have been had they remained contracted-in to the social secu- 
rity system. Since it is likely to be higher, as suggested, this retirement 
wealth effect may have led to a reduction in their overall saving. 
6.4  Pension Reform: Distributional Outcomes in Great Britain 
The presence of greater contracting-out might be expected to lead to 
greater inequality for two reasons. First, private pension incomes may be 
more volatile than state incomes. Second, because, in the 1980s and 1990s, 
average private pensions grew much faster than state pensions and, as we 
have seen, higher earners are more likely to have contracted out. Despite 
cutbacks in the basic pension since 198  1, pensioners’ incomes over the last 
twenty years have, on average, grown more quickly than that of the popu- 
lation as a whole. The net income, before housing costs, of both pensioner 
couples and single pensioners was some 60 percent higher in real terms in 
1996-1997 than in 1979, compared to real average earnings growth over 
the period of 38 percent (DSS 2000~).  This has been due to real increases 
in incomes from state pensions (as SERPS gradually matured after its in- 
troduction in 1978), means-tested benefits, occupational pensions, and in- 
vestments (DSS 2000a). 
This real increase in pensioner incomes has led to pensioners’ now being 
underrepresented in the poorest 10 percent of the population, which since 
the start of the 1970s has tended to be occupied by other unwaged groups 
such as the unemployed and single parents (Goodman and Webb 1994). 
They are still overrepresented in the bottom half of the income distribu- 
ti01-1.~)  These real increases in incomes have not, however, been evenly 
spread across the pensioner distribution. Johnson and Stears (1995) show 
that while income inequality among pensioners fell from the early 1960s to 
the late 197Os, it rose sharply during the 1980s. This was caused by an in- 
crease in the inequality of income from a combination of investments and 
private pensions. Growing inequality alongside growing average real in- 
comes is shown in figure 6.6, which gives gross incomes for pensioner cou- 
ples in 1979 and 1998-1999, by income quintile, at July 1998 prices. 
How do these levels and trends in pensioner inequality compare to those 
of other countries? A number of country-specific studies in Disney and 
Johnson (2001) yield three broad conclusions. First, as in Great Britain, 
pensioners are typically overrepresented in the lower half of the equival- 
ized income distribution, but underrepresented in the lowest quintile of the 
33. Of course it could be the case that, due to dissaving, consumption by the retired was ac- 
tually much higher than their current incomes. However, as discussed in Banks, Blundell, and 
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sources Survey and the 1979 Family Expenditure Survey. Clark and Taylor (2000) show that 
valid comparisons can be made between the two surveys. 
income distribution. Second, income inequality among pensioners is typi- 
cally greater in countries that offer comprehensive earnings replacement 
(the Bismarck system) than in countries where the state focuses on provid- 
ing a benefit “floor” (the Beveridge system). This is true even when private 
sources of income are included. Third, there are no common trends in in- 
equality of pensioner incomes across countries. 
6.5  Labor Supply and Retirement: Impact of Pension Reform 
Research into labor supply of the elderly, and the role of tax and pension 
reforms in the 1980s  and 1990s, has been fairly limited in Great Britain, un- 
like in the United States. In any event, a number of retirement issues lie out- 
side the scope of the present paper. A comprehensive survey of data and 
sources on retirement is contained in Blundell and Johnson (1999); more 
specific accounts of and possible explanations for the decline in labor force 
participation over the period of the 1980s and 1990s are contained in Dil- 
not et al. (1994) and Disney (1999). Again, three salient conclusions emerge 
from these discussions. 
First, there has been a steady decline in the labor force participation of 
older men, punctuated by more rapid falls in the recessions that character- 
ized the beginning and end of the 1980s. On the demand side, the massive 
restructuring of the economy and the lack of appropriate skills of older Pension Reform and Economic Performance  255 
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Sources: Family Expenditure Survey data from 1968 to 1999. 
workers probably contributed to this decline. On the supply side, the de- 
cline in participation was facilitated by the early retirement provisions of 
occupational pension plans and by the operation of the public program of 
disability benefits.34  The decline in the percentage of older men who are 
full-time employees is shown in figure 6.7. As shown in Disney (1996), this 
is not due to individuals’ reducing their hours but instead to falling employ- 
ment among older age groups. Indeed, final-salary occupational pension 
plans encourage individuals to remain full time until they retire.15  A fuller 
discussion  of these issues is contained  in Blundell, Meghir, and Smith 
Second, there is no explicit early retirement provision within the public 
pension program. Nevertheless, efforts have been made to tighten other 
routes into retirement before state pensionable age (sixty-five  for men and, 
from 2020, for women). Eligibility for disability benefits was tightened in 
the late 1990s, and the benefit made taxable, cutting its value to that of the 
basic state pension. Also, in an attempt to encourage employment among 
older workers, in 1989 the earnings-test condition for receipt of the basic 
state pension for earners above state pensionable age (known as the “earn- 
ings rule”), was abolished. Disney and Smith (2002) estimate that this 
change significantly raised the hours of working men aged sixty-five and 
(2001). 
34. Invalidity Benefit, subsequently renamed Incapacity Benefit. 
35. Although self-employment may be another route out of employment (Disney, Meghir, 
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above, but not participation rates nor the hours ofwomen (which is why the 
change does not show up clearly in fig. 6.7). Moreover, the government has 
become increasingly concerned as to the early retirement practices of oc- 
cupational pension plans, especially those covering public-sector workers 
such as local and central government workers, police, fire crews, and so 
on.3h  It seems likely that further limits will be placed on early retirement on 
actuarially favorable terms and on grounds of ill health in these employer- 
provided plans. 
Finally, however, the most pertinent issue for this paper concerns the im- 
pact on retirement behavior of the introduction of personal pensions and 
other new contracting-out arrangements. Since the majority of personal 
pension optants are young (fig. 6.2) and are still some way away from their 
likely retirement date, there is no evidence on the effects in practice. Basic 
economic principles suggest that there are both wealth and substitution 
effects here that rule out a definitive outcome a priori. The picture is fur- 
ther complicated by the fact that these incentive effects are likely to differ 
for someone moving from SERPS  to a personal pension and someone mov- 
ing from a DB plan to a personal pension (or DC-based employer plan). 
To  the  extent  that personal  pensions  provide  a  positive  retirement 
wealth effect relative to remaining in the public scheme (SERPS), then this 
might induce individuals to retire earlier than they would otherwise have 
done (although they could not draw SERPS until reaching state pension- 
able age). On the other hand, the incentive of a higher return on contribu- 
tions to personal pensions than the implicit return on contributions to a 
social security program (or, with actuarially favorable early retirement, in 
an occupational pension plan) might induce personal pension optants to 
defer retirement. Of course, contributions made to a personal pension 
close to retirement are not as valuable as those made at the start, but since 
people with personal pensions must annuitize between the ages of fifty and 
seventy-five, they can continue to build up their funds (through increased 
contributions or capital gains) past the state pensionable ages. For some- 
one in SERPS, years worked past age sixty-five for men  (and sixty for 
women) do not yield further pension benefits. Compared to someone in a 
DB occupational pension plan where the last years of work are fairly cru- 
cial in determining subsequent pension entitlement, the option value of de- 
laying retirement and contributing to a personal pension for another year 
is quite a lot lower-the  first years’ contributions matter much more. This 
effect would tend to encourage people to retire earlier, but could be miti- 
gated to the extent that people in DB plans are encouraged to leave when 
their salaries are at their highest points and to the extent that personal pen- 
sions allow individuals much greater flexibility. 
However, as the next section will show, there is a good deal of mobility 
36. Scc Audit Commission (1997) and Her Majesty’s Treasury (2000~)  for more details. Pension Reform and Economic Performance  257 
between types of pension arrangement, and it is very likely that those cur- 
rently contributing to a personal pension may, later in life, be in an occu- 
pational pension plan or even revert to the social security program. Thus, 
no firm conclusions can yet be drawn on this important issue. 
6.6  Labor Market Flexibility 
6.6.1  Pensions and Labor Mobility 
One of the implicit motivations for introducing more flexible contract- 
ing-out arrangements was that personal pensions, in particular, would be 
attractive to young, mobile workers. Greater mobility between jobs and 
occupations would, it was hoped, enhance the restructuring of Britain’s 
economy that was needed after the meltdown of many traditional sectors, 
especially in manufacturing industry, in the early 1980s. At the same time, 
insofar as contributions to DB occupational pensions represented a bur- 
den on business, the relative flexibility of DC arrangements with, for ex- 
ample, no requirement that the employer need contribute to plans, might 
permit current wages more fully to reflect differences in current productiv- 
ity and provide greater incentives on the margin for workers and employ- 
ers to find productive “matches.” Much of this reasoning was never made 
explicit. Nor was the more general perspective that individualized pen- 
sions, along with privatizations financed  by  public-share  issues, would 
generate a culture of individual share ownership and individual risk-taking 
which would move Britain away from the “Eurosclerotic” model toward 
the entrepreneurial model associated, rightly or wrongly, with the United 
States and some Asian economies. 
This issue of pension arrangements and labor mobility has not received 
so much attention in the British debate concerning personal pensions, and 
in this section of the paper we examine the theory and existing empirical 
evidence on how different types of pension plan affect labor mobility. Then 
we look at some of the empirical evidence for Britain using recent data- 
not so much as a test of whether pension type aflects labor mobility (where 
we infer that the existing literature is fairly inconclusive), but rather as to 
who took out a personal pension and whether opting into a personal pen- 
sion (especially where the employee was also offered membership in a DB 
occupational pension plan) was associated with subsequent job mobility. 
6.6.2  Theory on Pension Plans and Labor Mobility 
In looking at the impact of (private) pension arrangements on job mo- 
bility, it is important to differentiate between mobility in and out of pen- 
sioned jobs, in contrast to mobility between pensioned jobs that involve a 
change of pension plan. There are very good reasons that mobility out of 
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uncovered workers. The issue is examined in the United States by Gustman 
and Steinmeier (1993), who use data from the Survey of Income and Pro- 
gram Participation (SIPP) to show that pension mobility is much lower for 
people in jobs with private pensions. In a three-year period (1984-1986) 
they found that 6 percent of those initially in pensioned jobs moved jobs, 
compared to 20 percent in nonpensioned jobs. Of those who moved out of 
a pensioned job, 64 percent moved to a job without a pension and, fur- 
thermore, they incurred an average loss of wages of 6 percent by moving. 
In contrast, 14 percent of movers out of uncovered jobs gained pension 
coverage by moving, and all movers previously in uncovered jobs gained on 
average 7 percent wages by moving. This highlights the fact that there are 
strong deterrents to moving out of a pensioned job per se, which should be 
separated from the “costs” arising from moving between pensionable jobs 
associated with nonportability of pensions. 
The fact that people in Great Britain can opt not only out of  social se- 
curity but also out of an existing occupational pension plan potentially 
allows us to separate mobility that is associated with choice of pension 
arrangements from mobility associated with the nature of pensioned jobs. 
But it also raises very clearly the more general problem with studies of pen- 
sion coverage and labor mobility: that of selfselection. There may be large 
costs, as in the SIPP example above, to moving in and out of the pension- 
covered sector, and between pensioned jobs,  so pension  arrangements 
affect the mobility incentives of employees. But it is also likely that em- 
ployers who offer pensions will select employees on the basis of their as- 
sessed propensity to move between jobs and that employees will also select 
jobs on the basis of job-specific costs of mobility. Indeed, nonrandom se- 
lection of  employees is central to any rationalization  of why  employers 
provide pensions at all (Lazear 1979; Ippolito 1997). 
This caveat applies particularly to Great Britain, where moving pension 
plan need not involve changing job at all. The individual opting-out strat- 
egy is likely to be followed by those most inclined to move between jobs, 
and who thereby require a more portable pension arrangement. So while it 
is possible, by comparisons across countries and over time, to ask whether 
more flexible pension arrangements are associated with greater labor mo- 
bilit~,~’  at the microeconomic level we may be observing pure selection in 
Britain rather than the impact of institutional arrangements on behavior. 
The basic theory on pension plans and the costs ofjob  mobility are sum- 
marized in Bodie, Marcus, and Merton (1 988), Lazear and Moore (1988), 
and Ippolito (1997). We focus here in particular on the incentives associ- 
37. And even this cross-country or temporal “experiment” may be problematic--the  re- 
forms which permitted greater flexibility in pension arrangements  in Britain in the 1980s may 
have themselves been stimulated by the greater flexibility in the British labor market in other 
dimensions, such as the decline of trade unions, shift toward private services and away from 
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ated with job mobility between pension-covered jobs (not, e.g., those in- 
centives associated with retirement). As illustrated by Gustman and Stein- 
meier (1993), the costs of moving from a covered to an uncovered job are 
both larger and more transparent. As we shall see, in essence, portability 
costs in company-provided DB plans basically depend on how benefits in 
past plans are treated, whereas portability costs in DC plans are largely 
(but not exclusively) start-up  costs. 
For individuals moving between jobs within the sector covered by DB 
pension plans, the loss from job mobility arises from the loss of additional 
years of service and final salary in the original plan. It depends on the loss 
at the time of moving in the original pension plan from the lower final 
salary value, which depends on prospective job tenure.38  For a person shift- 
ing to a personal pension or SERPS, the loss function is more complex. It 
requires comparing subsequent loss of coverage by a DB plan (although 
this may be reversible later), offset by the pension obtained from the con- 
tributions to the DC plan or to the public program after that time. It is of- 
ten argued that the costs of leaving a DB plan are high because an employer 
typically contributes to a DB plan and, by leaving the plan, the employee 
loses these additional contributions. An individual simply leaving a DB 
plan to buy a personal pension or to rejoin SERPS  is presumably unable to 
compensate for this loss of contributions but, for job movers, the absence 
of employer pension contributions (deferred pay) ought to be compen- 
sated by higher current pay. On the other hand, if, ceteris paribus, DB plan 
providers actually also pay higher wages (as suggested by  Gustman and 
Steinmeier 1993), then the costs of leaving the covered sector-in  both lost 
pension and wages-would  be considerable. 
In principle, as suggested above, DC  plans such as personal pensions are 
fully and costlessly transferable. In practice, there may be costs where the 
existing personal pension plan “lapses” because the individual starts an- 
other personal pension plan, joins an occupational pension scheme, or, in- 
deed, reverts to SERPS, the social security benefit. A cost will typically 
arise because personal pensions often have an up-front commission charge 
that is deducted from early contributions. For example, if the personal pen- 
sion is held for only a short duration, then insufficient funds may have been 
invested in the plan, net of commission, to recoup the gross cost of contri- 
butions in the early stages. This is clearly one of the reasons the govern- 
ment has decided that stakeholder pensions will be able to charge only a 
percentage of the fund, rather than having up-front or exit charges. In ad- 
dition, individuals with a personal pension who move job will lose out if 
the previous employer was contributing to the personal pension and the 
38. Most literature overstates this loss by assuming that the individual would otherwise 
have remained in the DB plan until retirement. The implausibility of this assumption in valu- 
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new employer is not prepared to, or to compensate in any other way.39  Of 
course SERPS, the public program, is fully transferable, but appears to 
offer much lower returns to later cohorts than alternative, funded, plans. 
Past Empirical Evidence on Labor Mobility and 
Pension Plans in Great Britain 
McCormick and Hughes (1984) estimatejrm-specijicpension capital as 
percentage of pension capital. They study the loss of pension capital from 
moving between (DB plan) pensionable jobs. At the time that they wrote, 
there were three options concerning moves between covered jobs: benefits 
could be deferred (preserved), a cash refund of contributions could be ob- 
tained, or there could be a transfer value into the new plan. McCormick 
and Hughes show that the “envelope” loss-minimizing function is nonlin- 
ear with pension plan tenure. 
To implement the model empirically, McCormick and Hughes (1984) 
use subjective data from the General Household Survey (GHS) on future 
job-moving intentions. The explanatory variables in their modeling strat- 
egy for the question “are you seriously considering changing job” are per- 
sonal characteristics, job satisfaction, and interactions of pension status, 
job tenure, and age, which are supposed to capture the nonlinearity of the 
loss function (a simple dummy for pension plan membership is insignifi- 
cant). The results all hinge on the coefficient on years ofjob tenure X pen- 
sion status, with job tenure not included as an independent regressor. Since 
we know from other studies that search is (negatively) affected by tenure, 
this can be interpreted as suggesting that tenure matters only in pension- 
able  jobs and the coefficient is indeed significant. However, while the econo- 
metric results obtain a quadratic on tenure, as predicted by the model, the 
curvature seems to be the “wrong way” in the results. 
Henley, Disney, and Carruth (1994) argue that a better identifier of the 
impact of pensions on  job mobility, given self-selection, is whether the par- 
ticular characteristics of a pension plan have an impact on the propensity 
to move. Of course, it is still possible that individuals self-select into the 
type of pension arrangement according to their implicit moving probabil- 
ities, but this may require a more sophisticated calculus than a simple 
membership de~ision.~” 
The empirical strategy involves using reported job-tenure intervals to 
construct the hazard rather than a binary variable approach, using the 
1985 GHS. The truncation of the duration intervals and the measures of 
housing equity (observed only for house movers) involves some standard 
econometric procedures for handling censored data. A key finding is that 
39. There has been a certain amount of controversy on this issue: see Murthi, Orszag, and 
40. But since the characteristics are self-reported, a natural criticism is that these charac- 
Orszag (1999) and Whitehouse (2000). 
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occupational  pension  plan membership significantly decreases the exit 
hazard from jobs, but reported transferability of pension rights increases it 
(on the basis of observed completed spells) relative to simple pension plan 
membership. Moreover, the effect on the hazard rate of membership in- 
teracted with time (duration) and time-squared is superior to a simple 
dummy, confirming the  McCormick-Hughes  proposition  that  the loss 
function is time dependent and possibly nonlinear. In fact, (for men) Hen- 
ley, Disney, and Carruth (1 994) get a result that approximates the curva- 
ture of the McCormick-Hughes theoretical loss function in contrast to the 
latter’s empirical results. 
Mealli and Pudney (1 996) is the only published British paper that at- 
tempts to look at the endogeneity of pension status, but it does so indi- 
rectly. It uses the job histories and pension plan tenures in the Retirement 
Survey to model transitions. Obviously, the permutations of possible mul- 
tiple state transitions are large over the lifetime, so their paper essentially 
uses a competing risks model to examine transitions between various states 
(e.g., a pensioned job, nonpensioned job, unemployment, etc.) conditional 
on treating the initial state as exogenous (but see below). Note that transi- 
tions between pensioned jobs but  with different pension  arrangements 
(which is the basis of the McCormick-Hughes model of job-specific pen- 
sion capital) are ignored. So this is not a test of job-specific pension capi- 
tal impact but of the impact of pension coverage on tenure, like Gustman 
and Steinmeier (1993). Their finding is that job durations are systemati- 
cally longer for pensioned jobs. Using a variety of instruments for individ- 
ual heterogeneity, the authors argue that the differences in duration be- 
tween pensioned and nonpensioned are not wholly eliminated (see their 
table VIII). So there may be a “pension coverage effect” after all. 
Overall, the findings of British studies are 
1.  that the theoretical relationship between job-specific pension capital 
2.  that (DB) pensionable jobs have longer durations; 
3.  that this is not wholly due to heterogeneity (self-selection); 
4.  that transferable pension rights are associated with more job mobil- 
5.  that there appears to be a nonlinear relationship between duration 
and tenure is nonlinear; 
ity; and 
and the “pension effect” in DB plans. 
6.6.3 
Our aim in this section of the paper is to provide a preliminary empiri- 
cal analysis of the link between individuals’ pension arrangements and 
their subsequent labor market mobility. We will exploit the feature of the 
British institutional arrangements since 1988 that allows individuals who 
are offered an occupational pension to opt out of the plan and choose their 
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own personal pension or SERPS. Our strategy is to compare the job mo- 
bility of people who are offered a DB employer’s  plan and choose not to be 
in it with the job mobility of people who do  belong to the DB occupational 
pension plan offered. If the incentive effect of membership dominates, then 
the subsequent rates of mobility of nonjoiners will be similar to those who 
were not offered membership (other things being equal). If the differences 
between covered and uncovered workers are dominated by employer (or 
employee) selection, the rates of job mobility of covered workers will be 
similar, whether or not they  join the company5 pension plan. This does not 
explicitly handle the endogeneity of  pension choice of employees rigor- 
ously, but provides some initial evidence as to the relative importance of 
the incentive and the selection effects outlined above. To examine these is- 
sues we use data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). This is 
a panel survey that has been following the same individuals over time since 
1991. We  use data from waves 2 through 8 (1992-1998  inclusive). The 
BHPS collects detailed information on individuals’ employment and their 
socioeconomic characteristics.  It also contains  a number  of  questions 
about their pension arrangements. The survey asks, “Does your present 
employer run a pension scheme or superannuation scheme for which you 
are eligible?” If the answer is yes, respondents are then asked, “Do you be- 
long to your employer’s pension scheme?” 
In addition, from the second wave onward all respondents are asked 
questions about their personal pension arrangements: “In the past year, 
that is since September 1st 1991 have you paid any contributions or premi- 
ums for a private personal pension, or had such contributions paid on your 
behalf by the Department of Social Security?” If the answer to this is yes, 
respondents are asked to say whether they took out their pensions before 
or after June 1988 and the year they first took out their pensions. They are 
also asked whether they have made any additional contributions over and 
above the contracted-out rebate, and how much the last contribution was. 
The advantage of the BHPS data is that they allow us to identify those 
people who were offered pension schemes by their employers but chose in- 
stead to have their own personal pensions. Also, the data allow us to iden- 
tify those people who were offered pensions by their employers and chose 
to participate in the schemes. The main part of our analysis will focus on 
differences in the labor market mobility between these two groups. How- 
ever, there are a number of respects in which the definition of these groups 
is not as clean as we would like.4’ 
41. In particular, individuals are not asked whether their employers offer them occupa- 
tional pension plans. Rather, they are asked about any pension schemes offered by their em- 
ployers. This might include people who are offered group personal pension schemes. We 
should be able to identify these people since they are likely to report that they are offered pen- 
sion schemes to which they belong and that they have personal pensions. We might therefore 
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Table 6.4  Occupational Pension Plans, by Type (%) 
Private-Sector  Public-Sector  All 
Schemes  Schemes  Schemes 
Defined-benefit plans  78  98  80 
Defined-contribution plans  16  2  14 
6  Hybrid  6  - 
Source: National Association of Pension Funds Annual Survey of Occupational Schemes, 
1997. 
Note that we  cannot distinguish between  DB occupational  pension 
plans and DC  occupational pension plans. In total, nearly 15 percent of all 
occupational pension plans, and a higher percentage in the private sector, 
are DC  plans, as shown in table 6.4. Incorrectly including people who ac- 
tually belong to DC occupational pension plans with people who belong 
to DB occupational schemes is likely to underestimate the effect to which 
people opt out of occupational pension plans with a view to future labor 
market mobility.42 
A final issue concerns the “mis-selling” of personal pensions that took 
place in the late 1980s. This suggests that a substantial number of people 
chose to leave their employers’ plans due to bad financial advice. This will 
tend to reduce any observed correlation between the decision to have a per- 
sonal pension instead of an occupational pension and future employment 
mobility. 
Bearing these factors in mind, we now turn to our analysis of the data in 
the BHPS. Our analysis is based on the sample of individuals who are aged 
between twenty and fifty-nine in the first wave of the BHPS and who are 
present in all eight waves. Table 6.5 compares the pension status of em- 
ployees in the BHPS in 1992  with that ofthose in the GHS, which is a larger 
annual cross-sectional  sample containing just under 9,000 employees in 
1992. 
Looking first at whether an  employer offers a pension scheme, around 70 
percent of individuals are able to  join employers’ pension schemes in each 
of the two surveys. The BHPS has slightly larger levels of membership of 
these schemes with 76 percent of those eligible joining their employers’ 
schemes, compared to 69 percent in the GHS. The table shows that pension 
coverage appears to be greater in the GHS than in the BHPS. This points 
to some potential selection caused by nonrandom attrition over the eight 
pension. However, adopting this strategy might lead to our wrongly excluding some people 
who are in their employers’ DB occupational pensions, but who also say yes to the personal 
pension  question  because they are making additional  contributions  in the form of Free 
Standing Additional Voluntary Contributions (FSAVCs). 
42. But note that Gustman and Steinmeier find no evidence that mobility is affected by 
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Table 6.5  Pension Status of Employees in 1992 
BHPS  GHS 
‘%I  of employees offered an employer’s pension 
YU  of those offered that joined an employer’s pension 
Men, full time 
‘%,without  a private pension 
YU in an  employer’s pension scheme 
o/;i in a personal pension scheme 
‘%,in  both an  employer’s pension scheme and a 
personal pension 
No. of observations 
‘XU  without a private pension 
‘%> in an employer’s pension scheme 
‘%I  in a personal pension scheme 
‘%in  both an employer’s pension scheme and a 
personal pension 
No. of obscrvations 
‘%I  without a private pension 
% in an employer’s pension scheme 
%I  in a personal pension scheme 
‘YO  in both an employer’s pension scheme and a 
personal pension 
No. of obscrvations 
Women, full time 



































Sources: British Household Panel Survey, 1992-1998  inclusive; authors’ calculations; Great 
Britain Ofice of Population Census and Surveys (1992). 
Notes: See text for explanation of abbreviations. BHPS data include only those individuals 
aged 20 to 59 in 1991 who are present in all eight waves and are not self-employed in any wave; 
GHS  data include all employees aged 16 and over apart from those in youth-training or em- 
ployment-training schemes. 
waves of the BHPS. Finally, individuals in the BHPS who claim to be mem- 
bers of both their employers’ pension schemes and of personal pensions 
could be either individuals who have group  personal pensions or those who 
have occupational pensions and are making additional voluntary contri- 
butions to those pensions. 
Table 6.6 considers how pension coverage has changed  over the last 
seven waves of the  BHPS.  Interestingly,  the  proportion  of  individuals 
choosing to join their employers’ pension plans rose from around three- 
fourths in waves 2, 3, and 4 to over four-fifths of those offered schemes in 
the eighth wave. As a result of this, and a slight increase in the number of 
employers offering pension plans, there is an increase in membership of 
employer plans over the period. 
The proportion who were able to  join employers’ pension plans but in- 
stead chose to  join personal pensions fell from around 10 percent between Pension Reform and Economic Performance  265 
Table 6.6  Pension Status of Employees Only, by Wave 
Wave (1  992 to 1998) 
2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
YO  of individuals offered an OP 
YO  of those offered who joined an OP 
All individuals 
YO  without a private pension 
YO  with occupational pension 
YO  with personal pension 
YO  with both OP  and PP 
No. of observations 
All individuals offered an OP 
YO  without a private pension 
YO  with occupational pension 
YO  with personal pension 
YU  with both OP  and PP 
No. of observations 
All individuals not offered an OP 
YO  without a private pension 
YO  with occupational pension 
YO  with personal pension 
YO  with both OP  and PP 















8  50 
- 
~ 
66.7  66.0  69.6  71.5  72.7  72.6 
75.9  75.2  78.9  80.3  81.4  83.1 
33.5  34.3  30.5  29.5  28.2  27.8 
41.8  41.4  46.7  49.4  50.1  51.2 
16.0  16.0  14.6  13.0  12.7  11.9 
8.7  8.3  8.2  8.1  9.1  9.1 
2,765  2,750  2,732  2,713  2,693  2,650 
13.8  15.2  12.8  13.2  12.4  11.7 
62.8  62.7  67.1  69.0  68.9  70.5 
10.3  9.6  8.3  6.5  6.2  5.2 
13.1  12.6  11.8  11.3  12.5  12.6 
1,843  1,816  1,902  1,941  1,958  1,923 
72.8  71.4  71.0  70.6  70.2  70.3 
27.2  28.6  29.0  29.4  29.8  29.7 
922  934  831  772  735  727 
-  -  -  -  -  - 
-  -  -  -  -  - 
Sources: British Household Panel Survey, 1992-1998 inclusive; authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Includes only those individuals aged 20 to 59 in 1991 who are present in all eight waves only and 
are not self-employed in any wave. OP = occupational pension; PP = personal pension. 
1992 and 1994 to just over 5 percent in 1998. This is possibly evidence of 
individuals’ learning from the “mis-selling” experience outlined above. Of 
those who declined to join employers’ pension schemes, just over 70 per- 
cent had no private pension arrangement (and, by default, those with earn- 
ings above the lower earnings limit [LEL] would be in SERPS), with the re- 
maining 30 percent in personal pensions. These percentages remained very 
stable over the eight waves of the BHPS used for this study. 
Also  of  interest is the frequency of  individual pension  membership 
changes over the period of the study. Changes in pension status are in fact 
extremely common, as shown in table 6.7. This adds complexity to our 
study since an individual cannot be easily identified as someone who has a 
certain pension type. Of those with no private pension arrangement in 
1992 only 60 percent were not in a private pension plan in 1998. Of those 
who were contributors to personal pensions in  wave 2, only 42 percent 
were contributors in  1998. But membership of occupational pensions is 
relatively more stable. Some 79 percent of those in occupational pension 
plans in 1992 were members of occupational pension plans in 1998. 
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Table 6.7  Pension Transitions, by Wave (employees in wave 2 only) 
Wave (1992 to 1998) 
2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Has no pension in wave 2 
%without a private pension 
%,  with occupational pension 
%I  with personal pension 
YO  with both OP  and PP 
YO  without a private pension 
%I with occupational pension 
YO  with personal pension 
Has occupational pension in wave 2 
with both OP  and PP 
Has personal pension in wave 2 
(Yu without a private pension 
YO  with occupational pension 
%with personal pension 
%I  with both OP and PP 
100.0  84.8  80.7  68.1  65.3  61.0  59.5 
3.4  4.6  17.0  20.3  25.6  26.4 
11.5  13.8  12.7  12.6  11.7  10.7 
0.3  0.9  2.3  1.9  2.8  3.4 
3.5  6.3  9.2  8.5  9.3  10.8 
100.0  86.2  84.0  81.7  82.6  80.1  79.4 
0.5  0.6  0.8  1.2  1.7  2.0 
9.8  9.2  8.4  7.7  8.9  7.9 
16.4  19.5  17.4  21.9  20.0  19.5 
0.7  3.6  11.8  16.9  23.4  25.8 
100.0  81.2  74.5  62.2  50.6  45.8  41.9 
1.7  2.4  8.7  10.6  10.8  12.8 
Sources: British Household Panel Survey, 1992-1998  inclusive; authors’ calculations. 
Note: See table 6.6. 
DSS  1998) have suggested  that certain types of  pension  arrangement 
should be matched to certain types of individuals-in  particular, by in- 
come level. While pension  mobility  may  therefore  also reflect income 
volatility and income mobility, excessive multiplicity of individual pension 
plan membership within the working lifetime probably results in reduced 
pension benefits due to start-up costs (in personal pensions prior to the in- 
troduction of stakeholder pensions in 2001) and capital losses (from mov- 
ing out of DB plans). Offsetting this is the possibility that multiple pension 
holding may have some positive insurance characteristics if the risk prop- 
erties of different pension types vary (Brugiavini and Disney 1993). 
Finally, we turn to a provisional assessment of the association between 
pension status and subsequent job mobility. Table 6.8 shows the percent- 
age of individuals who move jobs between each wave of the BHPS by their 
pension status in the previous wave. In total,  just over one-third (36.6 per- 
cent) of employees in wave 2 move job at least once over the period of in- 
terest. The first part of table 6.8 shows that it is those individuals with no 
pension and those with personal pensions in the previous wave who are 
more likely to have moved employer, rather than those who are members of 
their employers’ pension plans. However, this could simply reflect the fact 
that occupational pensions may be offered in the types of industries or to 
types of people who have lower rates ofjob mobility. A better indicator of 
whether individuals with personal pensions are more likely to move jobs is 
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Table 6.8  Percentage of People Changing Employer, by Pension Status in Previous Wave 
(employees  in wave 2 only) 
Wave 
Pension Status in Previous Wave  34  5  6  7  8  AnyMove 
All individuals 
%without a private pension 
YO  with occupational pension 
%with personal pension 
%with both OP  and PP 
All 
Individuals offered an OP 
YO  without a private pension 
YO  with occupational pension 
O/U with personal pension 
YO  with both OP and PP 
All 
Individuals not offered an OP 
YO  without a private pension 
YO  with occupational pension 
% with personal pension 
YO  with both OP and PP 
All 
12.4  15.3  15.9  17.6  16.4  17.6 
3.6  6.7  5.8  6.6  5.7  6.1 
10.6  15.6  12.0  14.9  16.8  13.1 
4.9  8.1  3.9  5.3  6.7  8.0 
7.6  11.0  10.2  10.9  10.3  10.3 
9.3  9.0  10.1  13.6  12.8  17.9 
3.6  6.7  5.8  6.6  5.7  6.1 
7.6  12.5  12.0  12.8  13.0  9.5 
4.9  8.1  3.9  5.3  6.7  8.0 
5.0  7.8  6.8  7.7  7.1  7.9 
13.9  17.8  18.4  19.3  17.9  17.5 
-~  -  -  -  -  - 
13.0  17.8  15.5  16.2  18.8  15.2 
-  -  -  -  -  .- 





























Sources: British Household Panel Survey, 1992-1998 inclusive; authors’ calculations. 
Noles: Includes only those individuals aged 20 to 59 in 1991 who are present in all eight waves and are 
not self-employed in any wave. Any move shows the proportion changing employer in any wave by pen- 
sion status in wave 2. Standard errors for the proportion moving in any wave are shown in parenthesis. 
OP = occupational pension; PP  personal pension. 
who were offered occupational  pension  plans.  Over the period of  this 
study, between 7.6 and 13.0 percent of those who chose to take out per- 
sonal pensions rather than join their employers’ occupational pensions 
moved job in the subsequent year. Of those who chose to “default” to 
SERPS, the fractions moving-ranging  from 9.3 percent to 17.9 percent- 
are even higher. This contrasts with between 3.6 and 6.7 percent mobility 268  Richard Disney, Carl Emmerson, and Sarah  Smith 
for individuals who joined an occupational pension plan. Looking at those 
who move employer at any point over the period, 42.9 percent of those who 
choose not to  join their employers’ pension plans in favor of a personal 
pension moved job compared to 27.4 percent among those who did join 
their employers’ plans. This 15.5 percentage point difference has a stan- 
dard error of 3.6 and hence is highly significant. This clearly suggests that 
those individuals who chose to opt out of their employers’ pension plans 
for a personal pension or SERPS were indeed more likely to move em- 
ployer subsequently. 
Of course, there may be other correlates with occupational pension plan 
take-up that are associated with lower mobility. We know, for example, that 
occupational pension plan members tend to be older than personal pen- 
sion optants, and concentrated in certain industries and occupations (Bar- 
rientos 1998). Further multivariate analysis, conditioning out the impact 
of other characteristics, shows that differences in subsequent job mobility 
remain, and are indeed heightened (Disney and Emmerson 2002). Here we 
redo the analysis for more homogeneous groups of workers, selecting in- 
dividuals in their thirties, who had the highest take-up rate of personal 
pensions (fig. 6.2). Table 6.9 therefore examines mobility rates, both year- 
on-year and cumulative, for this age group, in total and disaggregated by 
gender. We observe a similar finding to table 6.8 on average and for men: 
Table 6.9  Percentage of 30- to 39-Year-Olds Who Could Have Joined an Occupational 
Pension and Who Are Changing Employer, by Gender and Pension Status in 
Previous Wave (employees in wave 2 only) 
Wave 
Pension Status in Previous Wave  3456  7  8  AnyMove 
All individuals offered an OP 
O/u with OP 
YO  with PP 
Men offered an OP 
YO  with OP 
‘Yi with PP 
Women offered an OP 
YO  with OP 
YO  with PP 
3.2  8.8  5.0  5.4  5.2  6.1  29.2 
(2.2) 
11.1  11.9  5.2  8.5  10.5  15.9  39.7 
(6.2) 
3.5  6.8  4.8  4.5  4.3  7.8  24.8 
6.5  15.2  6.9  10.0  7.1  6.3  38.7 
(8.9) 
(2.7) 
2.6  12.2  5.4  6.7  6.5  3.9  36.6 
(3.9) 
15.6  8.8  3.4  1.4  12.5  21.4  40.6 
(8.8) 
Sources: British Household Panel Survey, 1992-1998  inclusive; authors’ calculations. 
Note: See table 6.8. Pension Reform and Economic Performance  269 
Subsequent mobility rates are higher for those who opted to take personal 
pensions although offered occupational pensions. This difference is signi- 
ficant at 5 percent on a one tailed t-test (10 percent on a two-tailed test). 
However, the difference is not significant for women. 
6.7  Conclusion 
This paper has examined a number of consequences of the British pen- 
sion reform strategy of the 1980s and 1990s, focusing in particular on the 
introduction of personal pensions as an additional opting-out strategy. In 
particular, we examined five aspects of the economy where reform might be 
expected to have some effects: 
1. Household  saving  rates.  Our tentative conclusion  is that personal 
pensions contributed a negligible net amount to household saving at the 
end of the 1980s. But a decade later, due to the fact that contributions di- 
rect from individuals and their employers had become more important 
than those from the contracted-out rebate, personal pensions are likely to 
have contributed more substantially to household saving. 
2.  Public3nances. The contracting-out arrangements have raised pay- 
roll tax rates by around 2 112 to 3 percentage points, relative to the status 
quo. They will reduce payroll tax rates by somewhat less as opted-out pen- 
sioners retire later in  this century. It is inherent in  rational voluntary 
switching that the government never recoups fully its initial payroll tax re- 
ductions designed to encourage opting out. 
3.  Income distribution. In a static sense, greater contracting-out might 
lead to greater income inequality for two reasons. First, private pension 
incomes may be more volatile. Second, in the 1980s and 1990s, average 
private pensions grew much faster than the contracting-out arrangements 
had assumed. This made them worth more than state pensions and better- 
off earners tend to contract out.  The future impact of personal pensions on 
income inequality will depend not just on future investment returns but 
also on the retirement behavior of optants. 
4.  Retirement decisions. It is too early to say whether personal pensions 
will affect the timing of retirement given the age structure of optants. It is 
clear that DB plans will discourage early retirement relative to DC  plans, 
due to the fact that the former are back-loaded while the latter are front- 
loaded. But the introduction of personal pensions will have both a wealth 
and a substitution effect. Hence the net impact on labor supply could go ei- 
ther way. 
5. Labor marketflexibility. We show that individuals who chose to opt 
out of company pension plans exhibit significantly higher subsequent job 
mobility than those who chose to join their employers’ plans. In order to 
condition for gender and age we show that among men in their thirties, 270  Richard Disney, Carl Emmerson, and Sarah Smith 
among whom coverage of personal pensions was highest, these differences 
in subsequent labor market mobility remain. In principle, further analysis 
of this experiment will offer a more precise test than the existing (largely in- 
conclusive) literature on pension plan tenure and job mobility. 
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